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We conducted this study to determine the knowledge, attitudes, and 
intended behaviors of New York City clinicians regarding bioterrorism-
related diseases after a brief educational program. Data on clinicians' 
knowledge and attitudes toward bioterrorism and related diseases were 
collected using a self-administered questionnaire following a 3.5~hour 
educational program. Participants (n = 310, 82% response rate) 
reported increased confidence in recognizing symptoms of bioterrorism-
.related .'diseases (89%), in addressing patients ' bioterrorism concerns 
(83%), and ability to treatbioterrorism victims (75%). Despite a high 
level of confidence in the efficacy of infection control precautions, 
participants ' knowledge scores regarding safe work practices suggest that 
. additional education is warranted. Educational programs are useful in 
enhancing the public health response to bioterrorism and its conse-
quences. (J Occup Environ Med. 2004;46: 77-83) 
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istory is replete with examples of 
biolOgic warfare, but the use of these 
States has been extremely limited, and 
the capability of the public health sys-
tem to respond to a biotetrorlSf event is 
largely unknown,l-lI 'In ·theFall of 
2001, the readiness of the U.s, public 
heath system to respond to a signifi- ' 
eanl pabJie health emergency· was 
tested after the intentional dissemina-
tion of Bacillus anthracis spores 
through the U.S. postal system.12 This 
act of bioterrorism, which. resulted in 
22 anthrax infections and 5 deaths, 
underscored the importance of the 
public health system's readiness to 
deal with the threat of bioterrorism and 
highlighted gaps to be addressed. 13--16 
Following so closely on the World 
. Trade Center Disaster on September 
11, 2001, the anthrax attacks placed 
enormous burdens on already 
strained public health systems, espe-
cially in the tristate area (New York. 
New Jersey, and Connecticut), Pub-
lic health responsibilitie,s after the c 
anthrax attacks included providing 
expert consultative advice regarding 
the appropriate care to anthrax pa-
tients, investigating possible contam-
ination sites, testing of numerous 
materials suspected of anthrax con-
tamination (the New York City De-
partment of Health and Mental Hy-
giene tested over 2000 such 
specimens in a 2-month period 
alone), hospital surveillance for new 
cases. administration of antibloUc 
prophylaxis to tens of thousands, of 
. " 'Individuals and providing at-ns.1\.. • . 
risk. communication informauon to 
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the general public. 17.18 These re-
sponsibilities were in addition to the 
routine deli very of essential services 
and affected nearly every sector of 
the public health infrastructure, in-
cluding hospitals, clinics! pharma-
cies, and medical practices, all · of 
whom reported a significant rise in 
the number of patients with psycho-
somatic complaints and antibiotic re-
quests. Yet, despite these many chal-
lenges, all sectors of the public 
health infrastructure responded rap-
idly and, in hindsight, with remark-
able effectiveness. 19 Nevertheless, it 
became clear in the Fall of 2001, that 
there was a pressing need to rapidly 
educate clinicians on the signs and 
symptoms and reporting mechanisms 
o 10 erronsm-re seases, m-
cluding cutaneous and pulmonary 
anthrax. Although few studies have 
examined the bioterrorism readiness 
of the clinical segment of the public 
health sector, several published re-
ports provide evidence of both 
knowledge gaps and the high levels 
of interest in bioterrorism related 
training.21- 23 
For example, an October 2001 sur-
vey of family physicians (n = 614) 
conducted by Chen et al. found that 
only 18% of respondents had any 
prior bioterrorism training, 93% re-
poned that they needed such train-
ing, and 75% considered themselves 
unprepared to recognize bioterror-
ism-related illnesses.24 Most of the 
participants felt more competent to 
deal with naniral disasters and natu-
ral infectious disease outbreaks than 
with bioterrorism. Of special concern 
was the finding that only 57% of 
these family physicians knew how to 
report· a suspected bioterrorism case. 
In 2002, Rico et al. surveyed li-
censed physicians (n = 134) and 
nurses (n = 121) in Miami-Dade 
County. The investigators found that 
97% of physicians and 92% of 
nurses were interested in receiving 
bioterrorism training.25 Interest was 
especially high for training on the 
recognition of potential bioterrorism 
events and on the overall public 
health· response to these emergen-
cies. Only 21 % of physicians and 7% 
of nurses in that sample believed 
they had updated knowledge on the 
signs, symptoms, treatment, modes 
of transmission, and communicabil-
ity of class A agents (eg, smallpox, 
anthrax, tularemia,. plague, botulism, 
and hemorrhagic ·fevers). 
A large-scale survey mailed to the 
medical and nursing professionals 
living and working in Hawaii. con-
ducted in the Summer of 200 I by 
Lanzilolti et al., examined the avail-
ability and capability of medical pro-
fessionals to respond to casualties 
caused by weapons of mass destruc-
tion?" Although the response rate 
was low (23%, n = 3386 for physi-
cians; 'and 22.4%, n = 2775 for 
nurses, elf gs are 0 mterest. 
As in other studies exploring these 
issues, the investigators found that 
both physicians and nurses reported 
having low knowledge levels regard-
ing class A agents and a perceived 
inability to recognize and treat pa-
tients with diseases of bioterrorism. 
Less than 10% of physicians in that 
sample reported that they considered 
themselves able to treat victims of 
bioterrorism iitcidents. In contrast, 
respondents reported generally high 
levels of willingness to report to duty 
during a bioterrorism incident, with a 
positive correlation seen between 
high levels of self-reported knowl-
edge and willingness to respond. 
Therefore, it may be possible to in-
crease clinicians' willingness to re-
spond to a bioterrorism event 
through physician education and 
training. 
Finally, a 2003 survey supported 
by the National Network for Irrunu-
nization Enforcement found that 
nurses (n = 2627) who were under 
the age of 50, were trained within the 
past 10 years or who had little or no 
experience with smallpox vaccina-
tions were less likely to consent to 
receive the smallpox vaccine. 27 
Knowledge regarding the effective-
ness of the vaccine was highest in 
nurses with higher levels of educa-
tion and in those wh() had received a 
prior smallpox vaccination. Nearly 
one third of the nurses thought that 
they were unlikely to contract small-
pox even if they were exposed 
. through close contact with .an in-
feeted patient. . . 
' The ability to respond quickly to 
the public health emergency resUlt-
ing from the anthrax attacks was 
dependent in part on the preplarining 
efforts of the Centers ' for Disease 
Control and Prevention (CDC) and 
other governmental agencies and in-
stitutions. One of CDC's plarining 
. initiatives included the development 
of Centers for Public Health . Pre-
paredness (the Centers)."! The pur-
pose of the Centers is to ensure the 
capability of the public healthw()rk-
sented by bioterrorism . and other 
weapons of mass destruction. ' The 
Columbia University, Mailman 
School of Public Health Center, one 
of 21 such Centers nationwide, re-
sponded to both the World Trade 
Center attacks and the subsequent 
anthrax attacks in a number of 
ways.>9 In response to reqliests from 
community-based clinicians (includ-
ing phYSicians, nurse practitioners, 
and physician assistants) for more 
information on bioterrorism, the Co-
lumbia Center developed, imple-
mented, and evaluated an educa-
tionalprogram designed specifically 
for these providers. These front-line 
clinicians are especially important to 
target for this type of education be-
cause front-line medical providers, 
they frequently have a number of 
barriers, such as time constraint to 
obtaining up-ta-date continuing edu-
cation information. To augment our 
educational program, we adminis-
tered a brief questionnaire designed 
to increase our understanding of · 
commun,ity-based clinicians knowl-
edge, attitudes, and behavioral inten-
tions toward diseases of bioterror-
ism. Finally, for planning purposes, 
we asked clinicians what additional 
public health emergency-related 
training they felt they needed, as well 
as the preferred format for this train-
ing. 
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Methods tions disease specialists from leading broadcasts) to detennine the impact, 
New York City m!ldical centers pre· if any, this had on their bioterrorism 
Educational Program senting the lectures. A public health attitudes and behavioral intentions. 
In concert with the New York City physician from the New York City Items related to the clinicians' emer· 
Department of Health and Mental Department of Health and Mental gency response educational needs 
Hygiene, the Columbia Center's col- Hygiene was present at all sessions were also included on the question-
Iaborating partner, and in consultation to discuss the Department's response naire. Copies of the questionnaire, 
wid! leading ptlmary care practi- to dle-anthrruc Il.Ul!cks' in New York along with coding infonnation, are 
tioners, infectious disease special- City and to present up-to-date case available from the ~orresponding au-
ists, virologists, and dennatolo- information as well as information thor. _..Jg~i~s!lts!... • .....!aL3l . .!5~-.bh.Q0!l!uJ:rJe~d~1lu;c:.aa~tj~QunuaLl)_~on~~th~ey-D~e~ll~artm~~e:n~t~' s~b~jQ~t~p.~rr~Q~ri~s~ml---.:=P~a~rtJ~· c~jp~a~p~tg~'~Jlere also asked to 
program was developed to address preparedness proc~ures. The lec- complete an ll-item course evalua-
the following topiCS related to bio- tures were supplemented with tion designed to assess the qUality of 
-";te;rr~o;;n~smffi;:.:::!::"":;~'::"':::=:':":':":::;:-'-pjj'nnffi11tea' literli'ruiC"iiiiij"' hiiid()utS, in- the program (ie. of overall content, 
eluding a copy of the slide presenta- success in meeting learning objec-_JIL.. JM~ic"!mll.bb~jQ~Jplllgy~~P~8I1lthblQljp~hlJly~sjkQ~lo~g~YI..,--tiiio~n~,~ro~l~oa~e~xnC8id;iiinWlitiihi=jN~ef,w'FYYiior~k(-'tives;- program organiZation, and so 
epidemiology, diagnosis, · differ- State and New York City Health on). 
ential di~osis, treatment, pre- Dep8l1niCnt contacthepotting awn- ·-Statistic.al analyses were con-
vention, illrection control, and re- . bers, seminal journal review articles ducted using descriptive statistics to 
porting requirements f.or specific on diseases pf bjgterrorism and measure deV'<lsrapbW-data, as well 
ca!cgoljA diseases of biOlellO!- other materials chosen for their use as kn.owledge, confidence, concerns, 
ism, including anthrax, smallpox, to the general practitioner. (Copies of infection control intentions, and ed-
tularemia,. plague and botulism 12 the training packet, including a set of ucational needs. Odds ratios were 
2 .. Psychosocial aspects .of bioterror- the training slides, are available by calculated to determine correlates of 
ist attacks contacting the corresponding author. intentions and willingness to respond 
3. The public health response The training program is also avail- to smallpox vaccination and other 
The program was presented 5 able .on ' the Columbia Center's web variables. 
times .over a 2-month period and was site. )29 . . , 
offered either in the evening at the 
end of the workday .or .on weekend 
mornings to facilitate clinicians 
availability to attend. At the time of 
the training, frequent updates regard-
ing recommendations for diagnosis, 
treatment, and prevention were pro-
vided by local, state, and federal 
agencies, and every effort was made 
to incorporate the most up-to-date 
information available into each pre-
sentation of the ' program. The pro-
gram took place in lecture facilities 
at the New York Academy of Medi-
cine in New York City . . 
Once the program was developed, 
it was advertised through a variety of 
methods, including notification to . 
various professional societies, web 
ann.ouncements, group faxing, and 
mass e-mails., The program was pre-
sented in a lecture/slide format fol-
lowed by a lengthy question-and-
answer period. A team-teaching 
methodology was f.ollowed with var-
ious experts from the New York City 
Department of Health and Mental 
Hygiene (NYC DOHMH) and infec-
Measures 
In the interest of maximizing pro-
gram time, we ch.ose to administer a 
single retrospective pretest· at the 
conclusion of the program. 30 The 
testing procedure .was submitted f.or 
Columbia University IRB approval 
before the prograni and was granted 
an IRB exemption. The test proce-
dure was explained to those in atten-
dance, and participants were asked to 
voluntarily complete a self-adminis-
tered 37- item questionnaire de-
. signed to evaluate their knowledge, 
beliefs, and confidence regarding 
their ability to diagnose, treat, and 
report certain class A diseases of 
bioterrorism (eg, anthrax, smallpox, 
tulareniia, plague, -and botulism) as 
well as their own concerns and fears 
regarding contagion. We also asked 
2 questions related to the clinicians' 
degree of exposure to the World 
Trade Center Disaster (eg, witness· 
ing the event at the time it happened 
either in person or on television or 
having reexp.osure through televisi.on 
Results 
Response Rate 
A total of 377 practItioners at-
tended the program; .of these, 310 
completed the posttraining question-
naire (82% response rate). Seventy-
five percent (n ;= 292) of the partic-
ipants completed the course evalua-
tion. 
Demographics 
Most of the survey respondents 
were middle-aged,malephysicians. 
The specialty with the most repre-
sentation was · internal medicine 
(36%), followed by dentistry (26%) 
and pediatrics (8%)~ Table 1 displays 
the participants demographic data. 
Knowledge 
On a set' of 5 basic knowledge 
questions, participants generally had 
high scores, especially on items re-
lated to reporting requirements. 
Lower sc.ores were noted for ' items 
dealing with the differential diag-
n.oses of anthrax (eg, flu-like illness 





Male 171 55.2 
Female 125 40.3 
No response 14 4.5 
Age 
Mean years 52.9 
Range 25--85 
Profession 
MD · 227 73.2 
DDSIRDH 27 8.7 
PAINP 22 7.1 
RN 9 2.9 
Other 10 3.1 
No response 15 4.8 
. No. years practicing · 
Mean years 23.3 
Range 25--85 
Primary practice 
Internal medicine! 111 35.8 
family 
Dentistry 35 11 .3 
Pediatrics . 24 7.7 
PAINP 22 7.1 
RN 10 3.2 
Surgery 15 4.8 
Dermatology 11 3.5 
Psychiatry 7 2.3 
Infectious disease 5 1.6 
Pathology 2 0.6 
No response 19 6.1 
Other 49 15.8 
vs. anthrax), effectiveness of screen-
ing tests for anthrax, ·and smallpox 
vaccination efficacy. Knowledge 
scores did not correlate with clinical 
specialty, educational degree, or 
number of years of practice. Clini-
cians with high knowledge scores 
were less likely to report recom-
mending the smallpox vaccine for 
their patients (P < 0.05). Attendees 
were asked about their prior experi-
ence with treating patients deemed to 
be at risk for exposure to anthrax. 
Interestingly, clinicians who had 
treated such patients (n = 59) were 
no more likely to have a higher level 
of knowledge aPout diseases of bio-
terrorism or be knowledgeable about 
appropriate infection control proce-
dures for class A agents than clini-
cians without such experience. 
Confidence 
Most participaIits felt that the pro-
gram increased their overall confi-
dence in their ability to: 1) recognize 
bioterrorist diseases (88.6%), 2) ad-
dress their patients' concerns about 
bioterrorism diseases (83.2%), 3) 
treat suspected cases (74.6%). and 4) 
report suspected cases to the New 
York City Department of Health and 
Mental Hygiene (73%). 
Concerns 
Clinicians reported overall con-
cern about future bioterrorism at-
tacks (77.4%), and specifically con-
cern about anthrax (58.4%) and 
smallpox (61%). Only 37.7% felt 
that the U.S . government was able to 
protect the public's health during a 
bioterrorist attack. They also re-
ported high levels of concern about 
bioterrorism among .their patients; 
90.5% of clinicians reported that 
they provided care to patients with 
complaints related to fears of bioter-
rorism during the 2-month period 
before the training program. No sig-
nificant correlation was found be-
tween clinicians' media exposure to 
the World Trade Center Disaster 
(WTC) and their bioterrorism-related 
concerns. However, clinicians who 
reported high degrees of television 
exposure to the WTC disaster were 
2.4 times more likely to volunteer in 
the disaster relief efforts (eg, assist in 
rescue centers·; emergency rooms, or 
outpatient settings, or donate money 
or supplies) (odds ratio [OR], 2.45; 
95% confidence interval [CI] = 
1.12-5.35) than those who had lim-
ited exposure. 
Infection Control Practices and 
Contagion Concerns 
Although nearly 69% of clinicians 
were more confident in their ability 
to use appropriate infection control 
practices after the training program, 
.their responses to several items dem-
onstrated that important knowledge 
gaps remain in this area. For exam-
ple, 40.3% reported that they would 
institute respiratory precautions 
when treating patients with cutane-
ous anthrax, whereas 14% reported 
that they would not institute such 
precautions when treating suspected 
smallpox cases. Ten percent of re-
spondents were concerned about 
contagion regarding patients with cu-
taneous anthrax. Clinicians with 
prior experience in treating known or 
suspected anthrax · cases were ap-
proximately half as likely to be con-
cerned about contracting antfrrax 
than thoSe without such experience 
(OR, 0.40; 95% CI = 0.18-.91). 
Clinicians' degree of confidence in 
their clinical· assessment skills was 
directly associated with appropriate 
infection control intentions (OR, 1.9; 
95% CI = 1.05-3.72). High levels of 
general knowledge regarding class A 
agents, however, did not correlate 
with appropriate infection control in-
tentions. In addition, experience with 
actually providing clinical care to 
known or suspected cases of anthrax 
did not correlate with infection con-
trol behavioral intentions. Table . 2 
summarizes these results. 
Needs Assessment-Further 
Educational Needs . 
The clinicians expressed interest 
in additional training on: chemical 
terrorism (89.0%), clinical diag-
nosis of bioterrorism diseases 
(84.2%), infection control aspects 
of bioterrorism (81.9%), treattnent . . 
of bioterrorism diseases (81.6%), 
and psychologic aspects of biotet-
rorism (74.5%). Training needs did 
not differ based on direct experi-
ence in treating patients at risk for 
exposure to anthrax. . . 
The preferred training methods for . 
emergency preparedness 
were: traditional lecture formais 
(86.5%), written materials (79%), 
videoconferencing and . 
distance education (59.4%), 
training through audios or- . . ,.,-.~ ... 
(44%). Several clinicians said 
would like to receive information 
e-mail. 
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TABLE 2 
·Questionnaire Results , 
Knowledge, confidence, concerns & infection control intentions of clinicians regarding to diseases of.bioterrorisrn 
No. ('!o) 
Knowledge. oOrrect reaponaes 
Reporting requirements for Bacillus anthrasis infections 298 (96.1) 
Use of nasal swabbing for Anthrax 278 (89.7) 
Post exposure prophylaxis for smallpox 242 (78.1) 
Reporting requirements for class A agents 195 (69.6) 
Appropriate diagnostiC testing for Anthrax 202 (65.2) 
-----'PIlIff"" .. ''''iiR'*'iaialo' 'iitolll"!a8¥R .. e.. eiia .... eflf"A'O' .. R''''~''''''' .. ,>--------------- -------- --41-2299-- ----{(4-'h6) 
Increased confidence 
In recognizing diSeases of b,oterronsrn 265 -- (88.6) 
_ _ _ ___ TIJEiI aq.i.IHj, to . addres$patl~Hts' concems-related'to-bioterrorlsm 244 (83.2) 
The ability to treat diseases of, b1oterrorism 
TI'le sBility te l"8!3ert eUssas8s ef bietel"ferism 
Tile ability to adopt apPlopliate illfectloll CUliLlot precauttomr·---
In the US government's ability to protect the public's health during a bioterrorist attack 
----.- - - I. -ffi-the-.uS--government's preparedness for a bioterrorist attack 
Concerns 
'I re$'fec patientS who were concernea about bloterronsm 
Concerned that the US is likely to experience another bloterrorist incident 
Personally concerned about the risk of contracting smallpox 
Personally concemed about contracting anthrax as a result of bioterrorism 
Personally concerned about the risk of contracting cutaneous anthrax from patients 
, Prevention/interventions 
Woutd follow established Infection control precautions for smallpox 
Would consult with the Department of Health before prescribing prophylaxiS for class A agents 
'Neald tCCOlli.IIClId sltullipox ;aeeilib to On" paticlits 

























Evaluation of the Training rorism-related disasters. Because tywide drills: We are also preparing 
Program data on baseline knowledge of cIini- assessment tools to gauge the re-
The participants overwhelmingly cians was not obtained, it is difficult sponse of the community-based cli-
reported high levelsof satisfaction to document gains in knowledge. nicians to naturally occuning out-
with the educational program. The However, the retrospective pretest breaks, eg, SARS. 
positive. aspects of the program that design has been shown to be an Our results support other research 
were noted included: 1) advanced effective measure of training im- findings and further document the 
level of the program, 2) clarity in the pact.31 In the retrospective pretest need and importance of clinical edu-
presentations, 3) effectiveness of the design, training program participants cation on th.e topic of bioterrorism. 
instructors, 4) program organization, self-report their perceptions of com- Since the anthrax attacks, several 
and 5) helpfulness of the. supplemen- petence after the training compared educational initiatives have begun, 
tal materials. Several of the partici- with their perceptions before the including programs developed by 
pants also noted that the convenient training. This approach (compared federal and state agencies, public 
schedule and location as well as the with the more traditional pretest- health departments, as Well as medi-
availability of no-cost continuing posttest design) for evaluating train- cal. dental, nursing, and public health 
medical education credits (3 per ses- mg has not only been shown to be an schools, with many cunicnla incor-
sion) encouraged their attendance. effective alternative but also has the porating the recently published CDC 
Overall, 98% felt that attending the additional benefit of minimizing the emergency competencies.33 The re-
_......,t:rauun;;;;,. ';;C' ;1' :;tg;-';;p;';ro;;gr;:;::am;;;;.;:::w,;:as::....:an=-.::ex:::t<::.e::m:::::el:,(y_~b:!:!ur~d~e;:!n~O~i1~p!!:arti~. c~ip:'.!an~ts~an~· ~d!.-mT,'axmu";!-;· _.z-_ . __ . '<e.!1.!!Y._~nacted PU1:llic Health Secu-
vaIWlble expenence. ing time spent on training.32 How- rity and Bioterrorism Response Act 
Discussion . 
Our results suggest that bioterror-
ism training programs are effective 
in improving community-based cli-
nicians' confidence regarding bioter-
ever, objective measures are also helps to provide funding in support 
needed to detennine the impact of of these efforts.34 Other initiatives 
such training, and we are currently directed toward this goal include im. 
developing several models of assess- proving the communications infra· 
ment of clinician response using structure, e.g. the Internet-based Cli-
methods such as tabletop and coun- nicians' Biodefense Network created 
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tern reportedly remains sporadlc and 
uneven.38- 40 In particular, anecdotal 
reports regarding the paucity and un-
evenness of bioterrorism training for 
the public safety sector indicate that 
this is an especially important group 
to target for~peciaIized training. 
Uniformed services employees (eg, 
emergency medical services, trans-
portation, fire, and police) should 
participate in basic emergency pre-
paredness training as well as training 
on their roles and responsibilities 
during any future bioterrorist attacks. 
The process of developing, imple-
menting, and evaluating educational 
programs on this complex topic for 
the many thousands of indlviduals 
who need them is daunting. These 
and other isSues will undoubtedly be 
of considerable interest in the 
months and years to come as the 
public health system continues to 
improve its overall emergency pre-
paredneSs and response capabilities. 
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